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ABSTRACT: In this paper I sketch a possible answer to the question of what professional 
athletes deserve for their sporting activities. I take two different backgrounds into 
account. First, the content and meaning of desert is highly debated within political 
philosophy and many theorists are sceptical if it has any value for social justice. On 
the other hand sport is often understood as a meritocracy, in which all prizes or wins 
should be solely awarded based on merit. I will distinguish three possible goods that 
can be deserved for doing professional sport – money, social status and appreciation 
– and show that athletes deserve them according to their achievements and that this 
justifies certain inequalities in their distribution. These legitimate disparities have 
nevertheless been embedded within a broader framework of social justice, which 
limits them based on a strong understanding of social equality.
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A professional athlete is a person that engages in sport for a living and not 
just as a hobby. Professional athletes do this at many different levels of pro-
ficiency, in different forms of organisation and get different things for doing 
their sporting activities. But what do professional athletes deserve for what 
they do and is what they get deserved? There are two possible approaches to 
this question. First, the whole question is flawed and answered by the fact of 
what athletes actually get. This approach leaves the answer to the market or 
any other person or institution that is willing to give something to people 
that do sport professionally. They have to decide what standards they want 
to use and it would be nonsense to interfere with them because they are 
arbitrary in nature. The second approach is to suggest that it is possible to 
‘objectively’ determine what professional athletes should get, and they should 
get that, and if they do not it is unjust or if they get more or something else 
this might be then undeserved. This second line of argument is also open for 
a debate on when and how a third party should or has to step in and demand 
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a correction of what athletes get. In reality both approaches often come in 
mixed forms and people argue with ‘objective’ criteria that are in fact arbi-
trary and not really open for debate.
An elite athlete in discus throwing gets much less of certain goods such 
as money, social status or media attention than a mediocre football player in 
the English Premier League. People that are in favour of the first approach 
will say that this difference is fair and that both athletes get what they de-
serve. People that want to follow the second approach can also come to this 
conclusion but they need to give at least some reasons to justify this distribu-
tion of rewards. Many claim that it is the market that decides what and how 
much athletes should get and that it is not only unnecessary but even unfair 
to interfere with it. Then the ‘objective’ criterion for desert is only what the 
market is willing to give or pay. Other criteria can be introduced by those 
following the second approach. It could be argued that the football player 
entertains many more people and football is much more profitable, so the 
player has a claim to get much more paid than a discus thrower whose sport 
only exists because the public finances it and is hardly followed by anyone. 
These are legitimate reasons and they can in fact support the claim that – in 
this example – both athletes get what they deserve. However, as soon as the 
debate begins, and reasons for and against are pondered, this opens the pos-
sibility to include or exclude other reasons or to weight them differently. 
For example one could argue that a world-class discus thrower has to work 
harder, that he has to overcome many more obstacles to become as good as he 
is, that the competition is harder because he cannot hide behind teammates 
or that throwing a discus exemplifies ethical values while the brutality of 
football undermines them. So one could conclude that the discus thrower de-
serves more than the football player and that what they actually get is unfair. 
Then one can either fall back to the first approach and claim that whatever 
the counter arguments are, both get what they deserve because it is useless 
to debate about the arbitrary reasons someone might have to give a football 
player more than a discus thrower. One could also stick within the discussion 
and argue why these arguments in favour of the discus thrower are weaker 
than those for the football player. However, as many people will add, even 
if there are good reasons why a discus thrower does not get what he deserves 
and that the football player gets too much, nobody has any right to intervene. 
In the end it is a free market, and with that the discussion is over.
Obviously, from a philosophical point of view this is not satisfying or at 
least not satisfying if one does not trust the market that much and has good 
reasons to think that market outcomes can be seriously flawed and that an 
intervention is sometimes necessary and obliged. The question of what a pro-
fessional athlete deserves reflects all the difficulties there are with the concept 
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of desert and the idea of distributing goods through a market in general. It is 
highly questionable that the market produces fair results but it is just as ques-
tionable in deciding what other way of determining desert should be used 
(Olsaretti 2004). Some theorists are in favour of dropping the idea of desert 
at all, while others have countered these concerns within a framework of so-
cial justice that argues for an extensive equal distribution of basic goods and 
only leaves surplus goods and benefits to be distributed according to desert.
Nonetheless it is not a just a useless academic debate to reflect on what 
professional athletes deserve. The concept of desert is an important feature 
for the shaping of modern, capitalist societies and is therefore also inevitable 
connected with all the problems that arise in such societies. The question of 
what people deserve, and therefore also the question of what athletes deserve, 
are closely connected issues of social justice. This is true for all athletes but 
the problem is maybe best displayed by those multi-millionaire athletes that 
are quite common in modern elite sports. These high salaries certainly pose 
questions of social justice (Schweiger 2012). For example, Prince Fielder, a 
baseball player in Major League Baseball in the USA, has signed a new con-
tract in 2012 paying him $214 million over the next ten years, which is as 
much as the combined annual salary of 555 ‘normal’ full-time workers (the 
annual median salary of a full-time worker was $38532 in 2010). Does he 
deserve that contract and on what grounds? Is it a violation of justice to pay 
one man so much more, while many others live in poverty? Very few other 
people earn $214 million, so Fielder has to do something very special and 
very deserving. It is without any the doubt that he is an exceptional ball 
player but to question if he deserves what he gets is based on the general claim 
that every inequality needs to be justified. At least from a philosophical point 
of view asking for reasons is legitimate and not only a subjective amusement. 
$214 million is then not only much more than most other people in the USA 
and the world will ever earn, it is also obvious that this money could be used 
for a lot of good things to help people living in poverty, being chronically ill 
or have other special needs.
So, again, why do a few elite athletes deserve to be millionaires, while 
others just earn a decent living and many only the friendly applause of their 
friends? What is the relationship between these differences and the idea of 
social justice as a regulative idea for the distribution of benefits and burdens? 
I will not try to answer all the different aspects of these questions but rather 
sketch some parts of an answer. I will do this in three steps. First, the concept 
of desert and its place in social justice has to be discussed. Then the relevant 
dimensions of desert in professional sports have to be outlined and in the 
third step I will develop a social philosophical framework for evaluating what 
professional athletes should get in relation to what they deserve.
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Desert, Justice and Recognition
Many theories of social justice – especially in distributive justice – following 
John Rawls dismiss desert as a justifiable or useful principle – because it is in 
itself flawed or impracticable or leads to unjust results – and advocate that 
benefits and burdens should be distributed based on other grounds (Rawls 
1972). Others like the conception of David Miller have tried to develop a 
sense of desert which can be understood as an important feature of social 
justice that can not be substituted by other principles (Miller 1999). One 
of the latter theories is the recognition approach of Axel Honneth, which 
aims to understand social justice as incorporating three different modes of 
recognition: personal relationships and care; respect and rights; social esteem 
and solidarity (Honneth 1996; Honneth 2003). The founding idea of this 
approach is the assumption that the experience of these modes of recognition 
is the necessary precondition for living a good life and that they can describe 
what is morally asked in social interaction and relations. The content of such 
a good life is open to change and individual preferences but Honneth claims 
that it can be conceptualized in a way that it is thick enough to serve as a 
normative basis for social critique and a theory of justice. The key point of 
any good life is the idea of self-realization, which does not prescribe any con-
tent but rather its form as the possibility to live a life one has good reasons to 
choose to live. Recognition is of instrumental value, because it enables such 
a good life, and of value itself, because it describes the morally right way of 
interaction between persons. This rests on two different lines of argument, 
of which, one can be called an anthropological justification, and the other a 
social or political justification.
The anthropological justification claims that recognition is in fact not 
only something every human needs but that it responds to those features of 
human life that are of ethical value: vulnerability, autonomy and peculiar-
ity. The first and basic mode of recognition, personal relationships and care, 
reflects the vulnerability of the human that is always in danger of being vio-
lated by others. The second mode of recognition, respect and rights, is what 
humans owe each other because they recognise each other as autonomous 
beings. Equal rights for all members of a society are the social realization of 
this respect. The third form of recognition, social esteem and solidarity, is 
necessary because every human is part of social relations as a peculiar indi-
vidual who contributes to shared goals and tasks. The three modes of recog-
nition are therefore understood as ethically adequate responses to these three 
features of human life, without which a good life is impossible.
The social or political justification claims that the three modes of recog-
nition describe important spheres of social life that shape an individual’s life 
chances. Modern societies shape the ways in which personal relationships can 
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happen, they have a certain form of legal system and they organize the way 
in which social esteem is distributed amongst their members. These spheres 
are value-laden, which leads to struggles for recognition or struggles over the 
right interpretation of these values within them. These facilitate social change 
and, over the course of time, can lead to a more inclusive society. So, the 
social justification aims to show that modern societies institutionalise recog-
nition and that this is not only an analytical category but allows for deeper 
insights into the social embedding of normative claims.
Both the anthropological and the political justification converge in that 
the experience of recognition, both in its individual and its social forms, 
forms the intersubjective conditions for realising oneself and that this is the 
key point for social justice. A society is socially just insofar as it secures and 
protects the possibilities to experience recognition, and in which the insti-
tutionalisation of recognition is shaped in a form that can provide the social 
structures for these experiences. The content of self-realisation and a good 
life are then open for an individual to decide upon and can and should not 
be determined by society. Honneth views this as the important difference 
between his and David Miller’s approach, which also describes social justice 
with three similar principles.
To be sure, in contrast to David Miller, who wants to proceed from a compara-
ble pluralism of three principles of justice (need, equality, desert), the tripartite 
division I propose arises neither from mere agreement with the empirical results 
of research on justice, nor from a social-ontological distinction between pat-
terns of social relations, but rather from reflection on the historical conditions 
of personal identity-formation. Because we live in a social order in which indi-
viduals owe the possibility of an intact identity to affective care, legal equality, 
and social esteem, it seems to me appropriate, in the name of individual au-
tonomy, to make the three corresponding recognition principles the normative 
core of a conception of social justice. (Honneth 2003: 181–82)
Desert plays an important role in this recognition approach because it is key 
for the third mode of recognition, social esteem and solidarity. Social esteem 
is what people claim for their peculiar contributions to a shared goal and, for 
Honneth, this mainly takes place within the labour market (Honneth 2010; 
Schmidt am Busch 2010). To put it differently: social esteem is what people 
deserve for being an economically productive member of a social context. 
Social esteem is not necessarily bound to be distributed by a market and 
can also be claimed and perceived in non-market contexts such as the fam-
ily, for a hobby or in any club. Sport is one such area for social esteem. The 
reason to conceptualise the labour market as the most important sphere of 
desert is because modern societies can be reconstructed as ‘working societies’ 
in which work and labour are not only the predominant activities but have 
much deeper influence (Dejours and Deranty 2010). In all modern societies, 
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work is the main source of income, social security, self-esteem, status and rec-
ognition and its absence is the main source for denigration, social exclusion 
and poverty (Gallie and Paugam 2000). This may not be true for all, but it 
is for most of the population. Honneth writes about the connection of social 
esteem and work:
A mere glance at studies of the psychological effects of unemployment makes 
it clear that the experience of labor must be assigned a central position in the 
model emerging here. The acquisition of that form or recognition that I have 
called social esteem continues to be bound up with the opportunity to pursue 
an economically rewarding and thus socially regulated occupation. (Honneth 
2007a: 75)
However, this is only contingent justification for the importance of the 
labour market and the recognition approach could also take this as a start-
ing point for a critique of the labour market based on this approach to social 
esteem. Such a social critique is necessary to uncover the various forms of in-
justice that are happening on the labour market which arise from a distortion 
of social esteem which can in fact be used to criticise these injustices. It is not 
the principle of desert that justifies exploitation, alienation or discrimination, 
which are common in modern labour markets but it rather is the result of a 
labour market which is dominated by the interests and powers of a few, which 
ignore or undervalue the contribution of so many. These developments can 
then be analysed as social pathologies that are characterised by the widespread 
experience of disrespect and other forms of moral harm under the guise of 
recognition (Honneth 2007b). However, such pathologies do not undermine 
the positive and moral core of recognition and of desert. Justice is often used 
to justify injustice; this does not undermine the idea of justice but rather a 
certain interpretation. The normative weight of desert arises from both the 
anthropological claim that it is a necessary feature of human life that is an 
important constituent of the possibility to live a good life and from the politi-
cal claim that it can serve as a viable basis for social critique and social change. 
Both are important for social justice.
The place of desert within a recognition based approach to social jus-
tice is that it should be the guiding principle to distribute such benefits and 
burdens that are connected to contributions for which one is responsible 
within a social context, of which the labour market is the most important 
one in ‘working societies’. It is not that all possible benefits and burdens are 
attached to desert. The two other modes of recognition, care and respect, are 
not to be violated by the ‘achievement principle’, which is rather based on 
them. Only in a society in which its members live in such conditions where 
the experience of care and respect is secured and protected, can social esteem 
unfold its normative function properly. Still then it is always in danger of be-
ing distorted or used to denigrate, humiliate or exclude others.
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Is this framework strong enough though to justify the principle of desert 
against the most apparent objection: that it is impossible to determine for 
what people are really responsible and what is the consequence of natural 
talent for which one cannot claim any credit? First, the recognition approach 
limits the scope of desert and understands it as a complementary princi-
ple only. It criticises theories that put forward that all benefits and burdens 
should be distributed according to desert. Second, that desert is an impor-
tant category in everyday moral reasoning and in the shaping of modern 
societies is undoubted and the recognition approach understands itself as 
situated within these social practices rather than claiming a god’s eye view 
on them. This is what Honneth and others call internal or immanent cri-
tique, which tries to unfold the moral claims embedded in them (Kauppinen 
2002). Third, that people claim credit for their actions and that they also 
react to the actions of others in this way is not only happening all the time, 
but without it a feature of what makes any life a good one would be missing. 
It is of intrinsic value that the efforts are recognised and the contributions of 
each are respected. This can for sure lead to egoism, false pride and rivalry but 
it is equally important for cooperation and solidarity.
So, the recognition approach does not easily dismiss the critique of 
desert but rather takes it seriously. It also does not claim that it can solve all 
theoretical and practical problems that are attached to it or that it can provide 
a once and for all answer to determine who is responsible for what, but rather 
argues that there are nonetheless good reasons to think of desert as a valuable 
principle of justice. Without it an important feature of human life that is 
relevant for social justice would be ignored.
Difference and Social Esteem in Professional Sports
So far it has only be claimed that desert is an important dimension of social 
justice but its content has not been further examined. I understand desert as a 
four-part relation. X deserves A from Y in virtue of B (Kleinig 1971). X is here 
the professional athlete, while A is what he or she deserves, Y is the addressee 
of this claim and B is the desert-base. Within the presented framework, it is 
then just to give each what he or she deserves, and a society that aims to be 
socially just has to secure such social relations in which this happens. In the 
case of Prince Fielder the statement can be that he deserves $214 million 
from the Los Angeles Angels because he hits a lot of home runs. However, 
this is just the beginning of the discussion. One can question A and say that 
Fielder deserves only $500.000 from the Los Angeles Angels because he hits 
a lot of home runs. One could also question B and say that he deserves $214 
million, but not for hitting a lot of home runs but rather because he brings 
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in a lot of money for the Angels. In fact there are unlimited possibilities what 
Fielder, as a professional athlete, should get from Y in virtue of B.
I will limit my discussion in this paper to the sphere of social esteem, 
which means as to what an athlete deserves for his or her contribution for 
which he or she is responsible. I will not discuss whether or not the two other 
modes of recognition, care and respect, can be deserved and what this would 
mean in respect to professional sports. The main reason for this limitation is 
that I want to focus on the peculiarity of professional sports, while care and 
respect refer to universal features of human life – vulnerability and autonomy. 
I want to sketch a first systematisation and distinguish three types of benefits. 
Then I will discuss their relation to different bases of desert.
Social esteem can be received and given in form of material, social or 
symbolic goods. Examples for material goods are money, housing, food or 
any other device and material object. Examples for social forms of social es-
teem can be all different things that people are entitled to do; such things can 
be inclusion, access, membership or participation in a certain social relation 
or context. Examples for symbolic goods are any statements of social esteem 
through communication such as praise or other favourable expressions. The 
distinctions between these three are always vague, in reality there are overlaps 
and there are often combinations of all three. It is also common that social 
and symbolic forms of social esteem are expressed using material carriers such 
as membership cards, acknowledgments expressed in written forms or tro-
phies whose symbolic worth is only seldom determined by its material.
The value of most goods, whether they be material, social or symbolic 
in nature, is context-sensitive, which means that they can function and be 
perceived as beneficial or as detrimental based on the context in which they 
are received. This is also true for such goods that carry social esteem. To 
receive money can be a form of social esteem in the context of work, but it 
can also be denigrating in the context of charity. Even goods such as praise 
or honour that are most often understood as of intrinsic value can be harm-
ful. If a worker is praised for an accomplishment which was easy to fulfil this 
praise can be experienced and understood as nothing more than derision and 
mockery. It is not only important what people get, it is also how they get it 
and this is also crucial for an understanding of social esteem and desert. So 
also the general types of benefits I discuss are context-sensitive in this regard 
and it cannot be said that they are beneficial in every case. This context spe-
cificity is limited by social practices and rules that determine what counts as 
an expression of social esteem and provide guidelines for their sharing. Social 
esteem is institutionalised and, as discussed in the previous section, the la-
bour market functions as one its main settings. Therefore many of important 
material, social and symbolic goods are tied to paid work and labour. This 
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institutionalisation has three important dimensions. First, it limits the possi-
bilities of what is perceived as social esteem, which means that it is also tied to 
various processes of exclusion. Second, such frameworks provide security and 
also protection as they can be addressed to justify claims for social esteem. 
Third, there is a constant flux through which these institutional rules and 
settings change and develop. These changes can either lead to more inclusive 
and socially just practices of esteem or they can lead to a more oppressive sys-
tem, in which the new rules of social esteem only favour the powerful or the 
interests of few. It is this arena in which struggles for recognition take place 
and in which it is the task of a theory of social justice to develop models and 
measures to evaluate different practices of social esteem and desert.
So far I have distinguished three different types of benefits that can be 
deserved, namely social, symbolic and material goods of social esteem. Their 
negative counterparts – for example fines, exclusion, and rebuke – can also 
be deserved but I will focus on these positive forms. I also want to distinguish 
three different levels on which social esteem can be claimed. People can claim 
it from other individuals on the micro-level, they can claim it from an or-
ganisation or institution on the meso-level or they can claim it from society 
in general, on the macro-level. Within this framework I will now narrow 
my discussion to three specific goods of social esteem – money, social status 
and appreciation. I will ask whether or not they are deserved by professional 
athletes and on what basis. Therefore, my inquiry does not deal with such 
questions as what criteria are sufficient to deserve a win or to be named ‘Most 
Valuable Player’ but rather accept that each sport has its own certain measures 
of achievements (Kershnar 2011).
In general, I distinguish two possible bases of desert – or to put it in 
other words, there are two possible forms of contribution that justify social 
esteem: efforts and achievements. One can deserve something for trying and 
engaging in an activity even if it fails or if one is not very good at it. This 
model is not only of educational or therapeutic use – to support one’s devel-
opment or training – but also bears a moral value in itself as to put time and 
effort into something should not be neglected. One can also deserve social 
esteem for actually achieving something regardless if it was because of great 
efforts or if it was because of natural talent or even some luck involved. Both 
are quite common in social practices and again they describe predominant 
modes of social esteem in the sphere of work and labour. Stephan Voswinkel 
has described the on-going shifts to more self-employment within traditional 
occupations, from fixed salaries to bonus payments and project work and as 
such a shift from recognizing efforts to recognizing achievements (Voswinkel 
2012). The hours worked are no longer the benchmark but the operating 
numbers regardless of how much time or effort an employee had to put into 
achieving them.
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Also, in professional sports, efforts and achievements can serve as valid 
desert bases although there is a focus on the latter. One’s efforts to score a goal 
in football can be appreciated but the one who actually scores a goal will be 
more highly esteemed and one who does always try but never succeeds is in 
danger of getting cut from the team completely, while the one who does not 
have to train very often or does not need to work that hard on the field but 
nevertheless scores from time to time will be a viewed as a solid athlete and 
member of the team. In sports the distinction between efforts and achieve-
ments can be blurred and football can just give one example for this. Is to 
score a goal really an achievement in football or is it rather to win the game 
or the competition? An individual player might score a lot of goals but his 
or her team might still lose. Has he or she then only tried to win – which 
means only shown some efforts – or has he or she actually achieved some-
thing by scoring goals? These and other questions arise and they can only be 
answered for a particular sport but in general professional sports is focussed 
on achievements and values them more highly than efforts. I think there are 
good reasons to do so despite the fact that sometimes those who win are not 
those who worked the hardest or had to overcome the most obstacles but 
those who are lucky (Simon 2007). Why then say that achievements should 
be more important for desert than efforts?
First, I do not argue to limit social esteem only to achievements and a 
strong commitment to efforts is desirable and needed. Second, competition 
is an intrinsic feature of many sports and especially of professional sports, and 
to determine achievements (goals, winners, most valuable players, …) is an 
essential part of this. Sports is not – or should not be – about achievements 
at all costs but rather about achieving something within a certain setting and 
following rules. Equality of opportunity – which is for sure a highly contested 
concept – is as much an essential feature of professional sports as is winning 
and loosing. William Morgan has rooted this type of ‘good’ competition in 
cooperation.
Again, there is nothing wrong with competition per se, or at least a certain 
moral version of competition that is itself based on cooperation, on a consid-
eration of the interests of others, but there is very definitely something morally 
worrisome about the kind of competition to which most of these athletes have 
been exposed, the type that places a premium on winning above all else. (Mor-
gan 2006: 44)
A great deal of the attractiveness of professional sport for its fans comes from 
seeing athletes or teams compete for victory, viewing them earn it from hard 
training and the excellence of skill. Third, to prioritise actual achievements 
before efforts is not restricted to the sphere of sport but has a certain value 
– also moral value – in itself, that the consequences ultimately matter. One 
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can think of the following example: is it better to end poverty or to try to end 
poverty without succeeding?
Now, what is deserved for achievements in professional sports? As said 
I will look at three different goods of social esteem – money, social status 
and appreciation – which are of essential value, inside and outside the realm 
of professional sports. There are two justifications under which they are de-
served. One is an argument of fairness, which means that these goods are 
deserved if other athletes get them for the same achievements. This relational 
justice is an important part of social esteem and for the distribution of money, 
social status and appreciation. If athlete A gets $1000 for winning ski race 
X, it would be unfair if athlete B would only get $500 for accomplishing 
the same. Obviously this principle is often broken because it is difficult to 
determine achievements and because other factors such as stardom, character 
or negotiation skills can play an important role for income, social status and 
also appreciation. This is especially the case in team sports in which players 
have to negotiate their salary rather than earning it through prize moneys, as 
is the case in some individual sports such as tennis. Still, from the perspec-
tive of social justice the allocation of money, social status and appreciation 
through desert should also be fair. Equal pay for equal work should also be a 
cornerstone within professional sports.
The second argument is non-relational and has to show a distinct and 
clear connection between the goods deserved and the desert basis. Any an-
swer to this question has to look at the different addressees of social esteem. 
While it is common and legitimate to claim money for one’s work from one’s 
employer it would be absurd to claim that money from a stranger on the 
street, who has nothing to do with one’s work. The institutional setting is the 
key here, because it determines and secures these connections between what 
is deserved and for what it is deserved. However these institutional settings 
are – as I have already mentioned – always changing and they are themselves 
objects of normative reasoning and should be just. So, it is not enough to 
simply state that an athlete deserves $1000 for winning a ski race because the 
organizers or sponsors of this race are willing to give that $1000. One has to 
search for a deeper justification. My sketch of an answer is threefold.
First, professional athletes whose contribution does generate revenue, 
whether it be through ticket sales, merchandising or TV contracts, deserve 
their fair share of this revenue. In this case professional athletes are on the 
one hand comparable to regular workers as they are producers of these prod-
ucts, on the other hand it can be argued that the athletes themselves are the 
products, which further strengthens these claims. However, athletes can also 
generate revenue or significant benefits for their employers or institutions 
that fund them through other channels. For example, they can make their 
colleges and universities attractive and visible to a broader public, they can 
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bring in private funding or strengthen the local community. Second, there 
are many activities which are not sufficiently recognised by the market and 
which produce valuable goods. These public goods such as healthcare, culture 
or infrastructure have to be provided by the state or agencies subsidised by 
the state. The question is whether or not a society should subsidise profes-
sional sports with public money if there is no private funding, and I think 
that there are at least some reasons why a society should do that. Sport and 
also professional sport, it can be argued, are public goods and can have many 
different valuable functions in a society. They can enrich the lives of the citi-
zens, promote health or motivate people to sporting activities, provide enjoy-
ment, strengthen solidarity and community or help to build local or even 
national identity. Professional sport can be a medium for inclusion, a chance 
for minority groups for integration, and one that can generate a mutual un-
derstanding of being equal. It can bring together different social classes, re-
ligious or ethnic backgrounds. Different societies favour different forms of 
sports and there is certainly no right for an athlete of a particular sport to get 
funded by the public, but professional sport as a social institution is worth 
such public funding. So, if public money is involved it is again justified to 
ask for a fair distribution of this money and to give a fair share to those who 
are responsible for making this public good a reality. Athletes deserve social 
esteem for what they do. Third, even if a particular sport is neither funded 
privately nor by the public an athlete deserves something for doing his or her 
sport. He or she does so because he or she is following his or her chosen path 
and way of living. That may not justify getting money for it but it at least 
justifies not being humiliated for it either. The choice to participate demands 
to be respected for what one does and that it is appreciated by others.
Money, social status and appreciation are important goods of social es-
teem and professional athletes deserve them to varying degrees and from dif-
ferent addressees of these claims. Any athlete deserves appreciation for his or 
her efforts and achievements from fellow athletes, spectators and his or her 
employer, whether it be a privately funded club, a public institution or any 
other institution that funds an athlete. Any athlete also deserves that his social 
status within the community of athletes is determined by his or her efforts 
and achievements. It is also justified if an athlete gains a certain status outside 
his or her community but this does not have to violate the general idea of 
equal citizenship. Any society should take measures so that a strong mutual 
understanding of equality is sustained. All citizens, including professional 
athletes, deserve to be paid according to their efforts and achievements by 
their employer. If an athlete does his or her sport for a living – as a job – and 
whatever institution wishes that he or she does this full-time also, then a full-
time wage is deserved. It would be unjust – and maybe also not very efficient 
– if any institution, whether a private club, a public institution or a national 
17G. SCHWEIGER: What Does a Professional Athlete Deserve?
agency, aimed at having professional athletes and not to secure them a decent 
economic and social status. Athletes that pursue their sport and can not secure 
a living wage for it deserve the same protection from social welfare as anyone 
else that is unable to find adequate employment on the free market.
Conclusions
In this paper I have tried to answer the question of what a professional athlete 
deserves and I have done this in reference to an understanding of social jus-
tice as securing and protecting three different modes of recognition. Desert 
is incorporated within the mode of social esteem, which claims that every 
member of society deserves social esteem for his or her contributions within 
a social context of shared goals. Professional sport is such a social context and 
therefore professional athletes deserve social esteem according to their contri-
butions. The tricky question is then to decide which forms of social esteem 
are justified on what bases, which means to specify the concept of contribu-
tion. I understood contribution in two ways. First, a contribution can be the 
effort put into a task or in this case into an athletic activity, whether it be 
training or competition. Second, a contribution can be the actual perform-
ance or achievement of an athlete during training or competition. In the 
context of professional sports the focus lies on achievements during competi-
tion and while efforts do deserve social esteem they do to a lesser extent than 
actual achievements and a competition counts more than training. I have 
argued that achievement in this sense deserves social esteem despite the fact 
that no athlete is completely responsible for his or her achievements and even 
though effort, luck and natural talent cannot be separated.
The forms of social esteem that are deserved by such athletic achieve-
ments can vary between different sports, communities and societies and it 
is not possible to determine their content without reference to the actual 
social practices in which they take place. However, a few things can never-
theless be said. Athletes do not deserve to be humiliated or disrespected for 
their achievements even if they fail minimum standards or if someone has 
no interest in this sport. Athletes then do deserve appreciation from their 
fellow athletes and from their employers, whereby the employer is the per-
son, organization or institution that pays the athlete, whether in form of a 
salary, prize money or stipends. Athletes also do deserve a social status within 
their community according to their achievements but it is not necessarily so 
that they deserve a certain social status outside their sporting community. Fi-
nally, athletes do also deserve income according to their achievements, which 
means that it is just if one gets a higher income for being more successful. 
The reasons that justify these claims are based on the idea of fair sharing of 
the revenue, the recognition of efforts and achievements put into professional 
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sports that are of value for others – economically or otherwise – and the idea 
that every full-time job commands a decent pay. This also justifies differences 
in pay, social status as well as other forms of social esteem.
However, these differences based on desert have to kept within certain lim-
its. Two of these limitations arise from outside the sphere of sports and apply to 
all forms of differences in social esteem, while one is specific to this sphere of 
sport. The first limitation is set by the two other claims of recognition, care and 
respect, which demand the protection of equal rights and the provision of basic 
goods and services for all members of society regardless of their merits. The sec-
ond limitation arises from the idea of a strong social equality and a society that 
wants to recognise all its members’ talents, efforts and achievements. Although 
there are differences in a socially just society everyone should feel that his or 
her talents are needed and that he or she can make a valuable contribution. No 
one’s efforts or achievements are worth that much more that this would justify 
huge inequalities in pay, life chances or other benefits.
The third limitation concerns the sphere of sport itself. From what I 
have presented so far one can conclude that certain differences between ath-
letes whether within a sport or across different sports are deserved and there-
fore socially just. It is not unjust that football is a more acknowledged form 
of sport and it is also not unjust that for this reason more money is involved 
in football. Both discus throwing and football are legitimate forms of sport 
and it is an autonomous decision to engage in one or the other whether as a 
fan or as an athlete. However, and this is decisive, these differences in social 
esteem that athletes deserve for their respective sport are to be held within 
limits that are set by the intrinsic values of sport itself. Adrian Walsh and Ri-
chard Giulianotti have convincingly warned before of four different types of 
pathological developments in sport and an overestimation of differences has 
to do with all of them. They write:
1 The Motivational Pathology: the commodification of sport is pathological 
when it corrodes the attitudes of those who participate in sport so that they 
no longer pursue sport as a goal in itself. 2 The Instrumentalist Pathology: the 
commodification of sport is pathological when it leads others to regard athletes 
and sport itself as mere means and not as ends-in-themselves. 3 The Distribu-
tive Pathology: the commodification of sport is pathological when it gives rise 
to forms of distributive injustice. 4 The Pragmatic Pathology: the commodifica-
tion of sport is pathological when it undermines the long-term profitability of 
any sporting activity. (Walsh and Giulianotti 2006: 120)
I support their assumption that these pathologies can arise from the 
commodification of sport and a radical market-orientation. A desert-based 
approach to professional sport as I presented here is always in danger of be-
ing used to legitimise any of those pathologies or even assume that they are 
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just. Therefore the differences between athletes, between teams and clubs and 
between sports have to be embedded within the greater idea of a community 
of sports, which holds on to the conviction that each sport demands it own 
skills, its own talents and is of equal worth. Even if a discuss thrower can ad-
mit that his or her sport is a niche and that football is far more popular, these 
differences of social esteem should never lead to a state in which a sport is 
viewed as inferior or the athletes of lesser worth. This has not only to be done 
on paper or in friendly speeches but mirrored also in the actual distribution 
of such important goods as social status and money.
At last I want to come back to the case of millionaires in the MLB. Are 
they deserved under the assumptions I laid out here? Unfortunately I cannot 
give a fully detailed and satisfying answer here but I want to point to the direc-
tion one could follow. I do not doubt that all these professionals play excel-
lently, that they enjoy many fans, are good teammates, work hard with their 
coaches and make their bosses happy. So, yes, every player in the MLB deserves 
social esteem, appreciation and a high social status within professional baseball 
and by those who enjoy it. They also deserve to be paid quite well and to re-
ceive their fair share for producing the quality product of professional baseball. 
In Switzerland there was a discussion about limiting the wages of managers to 
a ratio of twelve times as much as the lowest paid employee and I think this 
would also be a good starting point for adjusting MLB player salaries. That 
would be high enough to express the basic idea behind desert, namely to rec-
ognise and reward differences in achievements, it would reflect the importance 
of baseball and its value, it would also be high enough to secure a decent life 
for all these MLB players and their families, it would be high enough to secure 
access to quality education and healthcare, but it would also be in a reasonable 
relation to the earnings of other, of those who are not so fortunate to be blessed 
with such a talent, and of those who do ‘normal’ but nonetheless important 
work. That would be a sign of social justice but certainly a just society demands 
more, also in respect to professional sports (Schweiger 2012).
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